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Abstract
The “Cosmological Constant Problem” (CCP) is widely considered a crisis in
contemporary theoretical physics. Unfortunately, the search for its resolution is
hampered by open disagreement about what is, strictly, the problem. This
disagreement stems from the observation that the CCP is not a problem within any
of our current theories, and nearly all of the details of those future theories for
which the CCP could be made a problem are up for grabs. Given this state of
affairs, I discuss how one ought to make sense of the role of the CCP in physics and
generalize some lessons from it.
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1 Introduction
The “Cosmological Constant Problem” (CCP) has occupied the attention of theoretical
physicists for several decades, often glamorized in popular science as “the worst
prediction in the history of physics”. According to INSPIRE, the High Energy Physics
online information system, Weinberg’s 1989 paper that first formally declared it as a
crisis has been cited over 3900 times.
Despite all of this activity, what is actually meant by the CCP is ambiguous. In most
cases, the CCP concerns a tension between the measured value assigned to the
cosmological constant (“Λ”) in the standard model of cosmology and the values of certain
quantities predicted in quantum field theory (QFT) that are usually thought to influence
it. But the status of the CCP as a problem is made complicated by two observations.
First, it is unclear by what criteria the quantities from QFT are considered to be relevant
to the standard model of cosmology built on classical (i.e. not quantum) physics. Second,
even if such quantities were made relevant, the current standard model of cosmology can
accommodate them via an unconstrained parameter, called the “bare cosmological
constant” or, in context, the “bare term” (c.f. Carroll (2001); Martin (2012)), usually
denoted as Λ0. As such, the CCP cannot be understood as a problem within the current
standard model of cosmology. (Section 2 will formally develop this claim.)
The situation is quite different when one leaves behind present, well-evidenced
physical theory and speculates about what a quantum theory of gravity will entail for
the future of cosmology. But competing semiclassical intuitions about what our current
theories of general relativity (GR) and QFT imply about future theories of quantum
gravity make it unclear how to assess that conflict: different assumptions about what
quantum gravity will ultimately entail give rise to different characterizations of the CCP.
For instance, whether or not one believes that the future theory includes some feature
responsible for a non-vanishing bare term Λ0 in the classical gravitational limit influences
what one expects ought to be so in regards to the matter limit of that same theory (in
which gravitational effects are disregarded). Consequently, any proposed “solutions”
offered to the CCP are inevitably segregated into several pairwise incompatible categories
that differ in their assumptions about what the future nature of the problem will be.
The immediate goal of the present paper is to explain how it is that such
incompatible theoretical proposals can all simultaneously count as plausible solutions to
the CCP, when the CCP is itself understood as referring to multiple, mutually exclusive
problems that only arise in mutually exclusive possible future contexts. As will be
argued in section 4, these mutually exclusive “versions of the CCP” contour a (perhaps
surprising) amount of structure within quantum gravity research, suggesting a richer
understanding of theory development than that which is conveyed by metaphors of
principled explorations of some ‘theory space’. Generalizing from the case of the CCP, I
will argue that the primary function of certain ‘problems’, at least in theoretical physics,
is to sketch out new avenues of theoretical research. Under this view, what constitutes a
possible ‘solution’ to such a problem is any proposal for the next generation of theory
that is well-suited to reproduce the virtues of the present theory and improve upon it in
at least one precise regard: by providing an explanation for how it is that the given
problem (newly articulable as a unique problem) is already handled in the new theory.
2 The “Cosmological Constant Problem” Is Not a
Problem (For Current Theory)
This section ought to begin with a concise statement of the CCP, but to avoid
introducing any basic misunderstandings, its statement first requires sufficient familiarity
with the physical theories it (allegedly) implicates. Consequently, the section will instead
begin with some preliminary details about the standard model of cosmology and the
theory of GR upon which the standard model is built.
In the context of GR, one may understand a cosmological model to consist in three
objects: a manifold M , a Lorentzian metric gab defined on M , and a tensor field Tab on
M , each of which satisfy certain technical conditions that will not be important here. As
a pair, (M, gab) describes a general relativistic spacetime (c.f. Malament (2012));
meanwhile, Tab encodes the stress-energy of a collection of matter fields over that
spacetime. As was said above, the standard model of cosmology is built on the
framework of GR, which means that the geometry of the spacetime wholly determines
the distribution of matter throughout spacetime (as represented by Tab) via the Einstein
Field Equation (EFE). What is the EFE is a matter of minor controversy, but start by
considering it in the following form (in geometrized units where c = G = 1):
Rab − 1
2
Rgab = 8piTab (1)
where the left-hand side describes the spacetime geometry (i.e. the curvature of
spacetime) via quantities determined by the metric gab, and the right-hand side defines
the distribution of the stress-energy of matter across the spacetime. The local
conservation of energy-momentum is satisfied by the purely geometrical fact that the
covariant divergence of the left-hand side vanishes.
The source of controversy concerning the EFE arises in the following way. It is not
difficult to show that the left-hand side of the EFE can be modified to include an
additional “cosmological” term
◦
Λ gab without losing the conservation law over Tab, as long
as
◦
Λ is a fixed constant:
Rab − 1
2
Rgab+
◦
Λ gab = 8piTab (2)
In this version of the EFE, the cosmological term is naively interpretable as the inherent
elasticity of the spacetime. Historically, when Einstein first presented his own model of
cosmology, he used equation (2), but he did not need to. One can easily modify equation
(2) to return to an expression like that of equation (1), where the cosmological term
◦
Λ gab is absorbed into the stress-energy tensor that governs the right-hand side of the
expression:
Rab − 1
2
Rgab = 8pi(Tab −
◦
Λ
8pi
gab) = 8piT
(total)
ab (3)
The two versions of the EFE are thus equivalent, but in the original version we can
understand the collection of matter fields represented by the stress-energy tensor T (total)ab
to also include the possibility of a vacuum term: a constant stress-energy defined
everywhere on the spacetime.1 Even when all of the ordinary matter contributions
represented by Tab go to zero (i.e. in vacuum regions), there is a constant quantity of
1Curiel (2016) offers an argument based on a novel uniqueness proof for the EFE that
the “cosmological” term ought only to be understood in this latter context (returning to
the original version of the EFE). Although relevant to the subject matter of the present
paper, Curiel’s argument should not affect the particular claims about methodology and
theory development that I will make. For this reason, I leave off a study of its potential
implications on desired solutions to the CCP for another time.
stress-energy that characterizes the region. In summary then, a positive-valued
“cosmological” term
◦
Λ gab is understood as corresponding to a negative-valued vacuum
term given by the expression −
◦
Λ
8pi
gab.
Whether one understands the EFE as the expression given in equation (2) or as the
expression given in equation (3) is a matter of free choice about what one considers to be
the theory of GR upon which the standard model of cosmology is built. Since the 1990s,
the standard model of cosmology has included a non-zero effective term like
◦
Λ, here
denoted Λ, to recover empirical observations about the accelerating expansion of the
universe.
That the standard model of cosmology requires a non-zero Λ is normally taken as
evidence that there is such a thing as an ‘effective’ vacuum term, like that included in
equation (3) but precisely characterized by Λ. Moreover, since the vacuum term
resembles a constant multiple of the spacetime metric, it is easy to interpret the effective
term as arising due to a classically available and gravitating energy density of the
vacuum, with a pressure of opposite sign and zero shear (c.f. Zel’dovich (1968), Frieman
et al. (2008)). This sets the stage for theoretical considerations about the
phenomenology of matter fields that could, in principle, be thought to give rise to such a
‘vacuum energy’.
At this point, it is crucial to note that nothing in the theory of GR and, as a
consequence, nothing in the standard model of cosmology prohibits hypotheses
concerning a new classical term Λ0 which behaves like a contribution to the effective
vacuum term in the form T (0)ab = −Λ08pi gab. This term is often referred to as the “bare
cosmological constant” or, in context, the “bare term” (c.f. Carroll (2001); Martin
(2012)). Note that, by the same arguments as given above concerning the “cosmological”
term, Λ0 may be placed on either side of the EFE. In its ordinary usage, for instance as
the quantity appears in the Lagrangian/effective field theory formalism popular in
contemporary high energy physics, Λ0 is regarded as a ‘zeroth order’ term in the
gravitational sector of GR, which is just to say for present purposes that, unlike the rest
of the contributions to the effective vacuum term that are ordinarily interpreted as due
to matter, Λ0 is ordinarily thought to be grouped together with the various curvature
terms determined by the metric. Hence, it is natural to think of a non-vanishing Λ0 as
introducing a “cosmological” term on the left-hand side of the EFE as in equation 2, even
under the interpretive convention that puts all other contributions to the effective
vacuum term together on the right-hand side. In this way, the value of Λ0 in the
standard model of cosmology can be understood, on the standard view, to modify which
geometries one properly identifies as ‘vacuum regions’ according to the underlying theory
of GR.
Why one would entertain such a term is secondary to the main point at hand, which
is that the standard model of cosmology is built in such a way that it already includes
the term, which could either represent a new constant in the underlying theory (i.e. the
standard view), or else it could represent a new kind of (classical) matter field in our
universe that resembles the other contributions to the effective vacuum term. No matter
its interpretation, its function in the model is that of a fit parameter to help match the
model to empirical data (even in the case where Λ0 = 0). The value given to Λ0 is wholly
determined by the following expression:
T
(0)
ab = −
Λ0
8pi
gab = T
(Λ)
ab − T (γ+δ+ζ+...+θ)ab = −
Λ
8pi
gab − T (γ+δ+ζ+...+θ)ab (4)
where T (Λ)ab is the effective vacuum term and T
(γ+δ+ζ+...+θ)
ab represents any other classically
available contributions to that effective term.
While there are no classical sources arising in any domains of physical theory that
resemble the contributions T (γ+δ+ζ+...+θ)ab , there are quantities in the standard model of
particle physics that could be candidates for such contributions, if only our theory of
gravity (and subsequently our model of cosmology) were built in such a way as to handle
quantum phenomena. Those quantities are the expected zero-point energies that emerge
from the fields described by the standard model of particle physics (i.e. in the framework
of QFT on flat spacetime) when those fields are arranged in their vacuum states.2 The
presumed relationship between these zero-point energies and Λ may be understood as
follows. First, interpret the zero-point energies as the energy densities of the various
vacua that arise in QFT; there exist arguments that these zero-point energies have
well-defined non-zero and non-infinite expectation values that are computable (in
principle, and to some approximation) within the framework of particle theory.
Moreover, for such quantities to be invariant with respect to the symmetries of the
implicit background Minkowski spacetime of standard QFT, the corresponding
(expected) stress-energy must resemble a constant multiple of the Minkowski metric (and
so, the zero-point energies must come coupled with a quantity of isotropic pressure of
exact proportions and with opposite sign, with zero shear). Insofar as the background
Minkowski spacetime can be naively understood as an arbitrary spacetime of GR, one
has found a stress-energy tensor of just the form one needs to account for Λ.
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that these quantities are quantum
2This is not the place for an extended conversation about zero-point energies. For
slightly more, see section 3; otherwise, for more careful treatments of zero-point energies,
see Rugh et al. (1999); Rugh and Zinkernagel (2002); Martin (2012); and Kragh (2012).
mechanical expectation values, which is to say that they are not quantities of energy in
the classical sense of the term (Saunders, 2002). Any treatment of these expectation
values as classical quantities applicable to a general relativistic model of cosmology
depends on semiclassical approximations that model quantum mechanical quantities as
classically gravitating substances. But lacking a mature theory of quantum gravity
which can be shown to reduce to GR in the appropriate limiting cases, it is unclear why
the predicted zero-point energy values from QFT on flat (Minkowski) spacetime can be
assumed to gravitate like otherwise classical energy contributions in curved spacetime.
(As will hopefully become clear in the following section, such an assumption amounts
precisely to a belief in advance about what will turn out to be true, in light of the future
theory of quantum gravity that we presently lack.) Moreover, even understanding
Minkowski spacetime as a ‘vacuum spacetime’ (the sort of spacetime on top of which
quantized matter fields ought presumably to be defined) requires that one commit by
stipulation to the belief that GR is a theory in which the bare cosmological constant Λ0
vanishes. Naturally, this stipulation undermines the extent to which zero-point energies
can be expected to explain or predict any observed value of Λ.3
3I have assumed, in parenthetical, that the sort of spacetimes on which one defines
matter fields are vacuum spacetimes, where ‘vacuum spacetime’ gains its meaning via
consideration of the EFE in the theory of GR. In the context of GR, only were Λ0 to
vanish does Minkowski spacetime pick out a geometry that is appropriately identified as
vacuum. As one reviewer rightfully points out, there is a sense in which, in the context
of the so-called “semiclassical EFE”, the situation changes: spacetimes on which one may
appropriately define a particular species of quantized matter field are exactly the “semi-
classical” vacuum spacetimes, where “semiclassical” vacuum spacetimes (with respect to
some species of quantized matter field) are defined as those spacetimes for which the zero-
point energies of that species of quantized matter vanish (if Λ0 is assumed to vanish) or
otherwise source a particular non-zero “cosmological” term characterized by Λ0. Hence, in
the case of the semiclassical EFE, zero-point energies feature in a new additional consis-
Regardless of these considerations, physicists regularly equivocate between the
effective term Λ and the interpretation of any term like
◦
Λ as a vacuum term belonging
on the right-hand side of the EFE and due primarily to the expectation values of the
zero-point energies that arise in QFT.4 Different heuristics to compute the total value of
the collection of zero-point energies suggest that the quantity is between 60 orders of
magnitude (Frieman et al., 2008) and 120 orders of magnitude (Weinberg, 1989) larger
than Λ. If this is understood as a rough but direct prediction of Λ, it truly is the biggest
(finite) disparity between prediction and observation in the history of physics. When the
collection of zero-point energies is instead considered as the “matter contribution” to Λ,
then (by the outline sketched above) Λ0 assumes the difference between the empirically
determined Λ and its total computed “matter contributions”.
Finally, I am in the position to concisely characterize the CCP according to its three
common variations, without fear of perpetuating any odd understandings of the terms
involved. The “old” CCP suggests that there is a problem in cosmology that Λ in the
tency constraint concerning the identification of vacuum states in the theory defined on
Minkowski spacetime (if Λ0 vanishes) or another spacetime of constant scalar curvature
(if Λ0 does not vanish).
I have some reservations about using the semiclassical EFE in this way (and any use of
the semiclassical EFE certainly takes us beyond our well established theories), but putting
those aside, the issue seems to me now to be even more stark: why should quantities derived
in QFT formulated on Minkowski spacetime (for instance) say anything at all about what
happens in theories formulated on other spacetimes, for which plausible vacuum states
(supposing they exist) are subject to entirely different consistency constraints?
4This equivocation is not entirely unmotivated; the hope, at least for some, is that
all sources of classical spacetime curvature according to the EFE might ultimately be
explained by quantum phenomena in the framework of QFT. But I would like to caution
against such optimism. It is far from obvious, for instance, why one should expect that the
resources available in the present standard model of particles exhaust all possible quantum
phenomena that could come to explain Λ in future theories of quantum gravity.
standard model is effectively 0, despite the seemingly overwhelming presence of “matter
contributions” that arise as consequences of the standard model of particle physics. The
“new” CCP suggests that the problem is that Λ is not precisely 0, while also being many
orders of magnitude smaller than the total computed value of those “matter
contributions”. The “cosmic coincidence problem” suggests that the “new” CCP is made
more peculiar than it may otherwise have been by the fact that the particular value of
the not-quite-zero Λ resembles the (classical) mass-density of the universe in the present
cosmic epoch.
But we have already seen that none of these variations of the CCP constitute strict
problems within the standard model of cosmology, because the standard model permits
the inclusion of a new term Λ0, whose assumed value provides, by construction, the
difference between the effective vacuum term and whatever other classical vacuum
contributions are identified. Moreover, according to current theory, the “matter
contributions” are zero-point energies that emerge in the context of QFT, which are
precisely not the sorts of classical quantities that readily act as contributions to Λ.
Nonetheless, in framing the subject in these intertheoretic terms, one begins to get
the sense that the CCP is foremost an issue of how it is that the consequences of other
theories that are, at face value, incompatible with the theory at hand can be leveraged in
the physical interpretations of particular terms within the theory at hand. If Λ is
interpreted as a vacuum term (i.e. the total gravitating energy of the vacuum), and if
the quantum “matter contributions” to Λ arising in QFT on flat spacetime are thought
to be exhaustive of all suitable (i.e. gravitating) vacuum physics, then considering the
remaining contribution to Λ (i.e. Λ0) as anything besides a vacuum term seems
wrong-footed. On the other hand, if one simply wishes to assign a physical interpretation
to the remaining contribution Λ0 as a vacuum term, such as by postulating the presence
of a constant, classical field, then one is wielding the standard model of cosmology
including the physical interpretation of Λ as a criticism of the completeness of another
theory entirely. In other words, while the CCP does not describe a problem within our
current theories as such, it does suggest problems that may soon arise, as one begins to
speculate about the contours of a future theory of physics that is meant to straddle the
overlapping domains of the current ones.
Pausing, for just a moment, our discussion of the particulars of the CCP, I suspect it
will be helpful to meditate on one of the general themes of this section.5 The point has
been made that the CCP is about a putative conflict between an empirically loaded
quantity, i.e. Λ from the standard model of cosmology, and a theoretical entity arising in
our premier theory of matter, i.e. zero-point energies. Recalling Laudan (1978), this
situation has all the hallmarks of an empirical problem (“. . . anything about the natural
world that strikes us as odd, or otherwise in need of explanation. . . ” [p. 15]), perhaps
best regarded as an unsolved empirical problem, given that it has indisputably directed
future inquiry.
On the other hand, I have stressed repeatedly that there is no sense in which the
theoretical entity arising in our premier theory of matter decidedly matters in
conversations about Λ in standard model cosmology, and the freedom of the bare term
Λ0 in current theory insulates our current standard model of cosmology from any similar
problem in principle. Any conflict here must therefore be understood in exclusively
intertheoretic terms; this is the conclusion that we have just arrived at. For Laudan
5I thank an anonymous reviewer, as well as an editor, for encouraging me to make these
general morals more explicit.
(1978), this would seem to place the CCP as a conceptual problem— an external one, in
fact. It is true that Laudan regards empirical and conceptual problems as co-existing
along a spectrum, or a “continuous shading” [p. 48], of problem types intermediate
between two extremes— my intention is therefore not to disparage his taxonomy. To the
contrary, what I find so curious about the CCP, and this will become the primary focus
in the following section, is that despite being, in some sense, a conceptual problem that
straddles our current theories of matter and gravity, it nonetheless seems most aptly
described as a first-order, empirical problem whose domain or context of inquiry just so
happens to be located within some future theory that we simply do not yet have. Since
we do not yet have that theory, there will be genuine expert peer disagreement about the
precise nature of the problem, which will subsequently motivate radically different paths
of research; this is the subject I will take up extensively in the following section. For now
though, the slogan to repeat is this: the CCP is about future physical theory, identified in
advance via the details that we today suspect will come to feature in that future theory.
3 Making Sense of The Problem(s)
It might be tempting to dismiss the CCP outright, and declare the physics community’s
reactions to it philosophically lazy, misguided, or even agenda-driven. This is the view
implied by Earman (2001, p. 207), who writes: “Steven Weinberg (1989), who believes
that physics thrives on crises, has been instrumental in promoting this problem to the
status of a crisis for contemporary physics. I want to explain why this ‘crisis’ needs to be
viewed with some skepticism.”
I do not dispute Earman’s claims in these remarks, but I confess that Earman’s
general attitude here strikes me as backward. The philosophical point to be made is not
that the physics community might be in error about a concern that is central to their
field (i.e. that “this ‘crisis’ needs to be viewed with some skepticism”). Rather, the point
to be made is that the physics community’s persistent worry about the CCP as a
problem (alternatively, as a “crisis”) suggests that there might be something else going
on. There is something interesting, that is, about the fact that the depiction of the CCP
as a problem for contemporary cosmology has not diminished over the past several
decades in light of all of the potential “solutions” that have been offered for it.
There is an explanation for this state of affairs, which was hinted at in the final
remarks of the previous section. If the zero-point energies that arise in QFT are
understood as predictions today about what vacuum energy sources will be present in
some future physical theory which unifies GR and QFT (i.e. the theory of quantum
gravity), and if, moreover, vacuum energies in that future theory contribute to some
effective term that reduces to a classical vacuum term, then that future theory (but not
any present theory) is thought to have to reckon with the apparent disparity between the
quantum contributions in current QFT and Λ in the standard model of cosmology.
Subsequently, solving the CCP consists in endorsing a possible framework for future
physical theory and subsequently demonstrating that within such a framework, the CCP
is an ordinary empirical problem with an ordinary solution already built into the future
theory. Insofar as any such solution depends on conjectures about what future theory
will entail, the CCP has remained (and will continue to remain) an open problem until
some of those conjectures gain sufficient empirical grounding to warrant adoption into
the corpus of established physical theory. But this entire conversation presupposes some
resolution to a fascinating methodological conundrum: how do we talk about what
future, as-of-yet undiscovered theories ought to entail, and on what grounds do we make
such claims?
In the case of quantum gravity, in which the goal is to find a theory that formally
interprets both the gravitational properties of energy sources and the physics associated
with quantum states, the standard move is to introduce a semiclassical theory of gravity
that is meant, in principle, to approximate such an unknown future theory.
Unfortunately, since the eventual theory of quantum gravity is unknown, it is unclear in
what respects and what domains of applicability this procedure is meant to approximate
that eventual theory, and a well-evidenced classical model of cosmology (e.g. the
standard model of cosmology) does not necessarily transform into a well-evidenced
semiclassical model when the underlying theoretical frameworks are swapped.
Nonetheless, this is the sort of architecture available to theorists interested in considering
possible eventual consequences of quantum gravity in cosmological contexts.
The point here is that claims made on the basis of semiclassical variants of classical
gravitational models are not consequences of current physical theory. Rather, they are
claims about what we might infer from contemporary physics about approximations of
future physics. This answers the first part of the conundrum voiced above (how do we
talk about what the future theories ought to entail: by semiclassical alternatives to the
current theories), but it does not answer the second part of the conundrum (what are the
grounds for these claims about such future theories). Notice that justifications for the
methods used to predict consequences of future theories can only ever consist in claims
which derive from the current theories, which (by setup) are silent precisely in those
contexts where the semiclassical theory is needed. Thus, the assumptions that go into
these methods are open to expert disagreement: there are reasonable disputes about
what semiclassical gravity entails for the future of cosmology, which means that there
can be no obvious answer to the second part of the conundrum. This conclusion is not
surprising. Nonetheless, I believe it is helpful to think about theory development
explicitly in these terms, i.e. as cases of genuine disagreement about the details of the
future theory sought, stemming from disagreements about what it is appropriate to
broadly infer about that future theory from our current best theories that we have
developed so far.
In fact, competing assumptions along these lines give rise to three broad categories of
solutions to the CCP:
1 Assume that vacuum quantities (i.e. quantities that resemble constant multiples of
the metric) do not gravitate as ordinary sources in the EFE. Then the CCP
becomes: what gives rise to the effective vacuum term characterized by Λ in the
standard model of cosmology?
2 Assume that zero-point energies gravitate as tensorial quantities on the right-hand
side of the EFE and exhaustively source the effective vacuum term characterized
by Λ. Then the CCP becomes: how does one account for the discrepancy between
the currently computed values of the zero-point energies and the observed Λ?
3 Assume that Λ is not exhaustively sourced by vacuum energies. Then the CCP
becomes: what other physical mechanisms can contribute to that which is
presently understood as the effective vacuum term characterized by Λ?
Note that both the second and third categories expect (or at least permit) zero-point
energies to contribute to the effective vacuum term that arises in the standard model of
cosmology. (Where they disagree is about what the status of the bare term Λ0 will be
after all vacuum sources have been considered.) In this way, they are both incompatible
with category 1 solutions, which assume that the vacuum term represented by Λ in the
EFE simply cannot consist in vacuum stress-energies. To get a sense of what this means,
consider some examples of category 1 solutions: unimodular gravity (c.f. Earman (2003)
and Ellis et al. (2011)) and gravitational aether (c.f. Afshordi (2008)). Both approaches
consider trace-free restrictions of the right-hand side of the EFE, and hence vacuum
terms are decoupled from spacetime curvature.6
By contrast, both categories 2 and 3 assume that vacuum sources, where they can be
assigned suitable stress-energies, gravitate in the usual way. But whereas category 2
accepts the semiclassical assumption that zero-point energies in QFT will come to (fully)
source Λ, category 3 disputes it. More formally, category 2 assumes the most common
semiclassical variant of the standard model of cosmology, in which the term that reduces
to Λ is considered to be explained by those terms that reduce to the zero-point energies
in QFT. Given this as a starting point, approaches in category 2 focus on undermining
6The inference here in the case of unimodular gravity has been criticized by Earman
(ript) (see, in particular, §4.1 therein). It is perhaps more appropriate to say: assuming
first that any vacuum terms are taken to be fixed externally, once and for all, across all
physical possibilities intended to be circumscribed by the models of the resulting theory,
unimodular gravity decouples those terms from spacetime curvature. Whether or not the
antecedent assumption is viable as an attitude in theorizing about cosmology is beyond
our purposes here, but will surely inform the sense in which unimodular gravity constitutes
a satisfying category 1 solution to the CCP. Per arguments in the same paper, it may also
be the case that unimodular gravity, understood as a different theory whose interpretation
precludes the assumption just articulated, winds up as a solution to the CCP belonging in
a different category— such difficulties seem to have less to do with how the categories are
mutually contrasted and more to do with the nuances inherent in delineating theories in
terms other than their interpretations (and particularly when those interpreted theories
have not been extensively studied).
the plausibility of the particular values handed over from QFT as contributions to Λ.
Approaches in category 3, meanwhile, begin with the assumption that there are other
mechanisms that contribute (perhaps exhaustively, perhaps not) to Λ that cannot be
understood as stress-energies of vacuum sources. Subsequently, work done in category 3
is spent seeking out alternative physical explanations for Λ’s particular non-zero value.
Hopefully it is clear how approaches in these two categories, insofar as they are taken to
be solutions to the CCP, are thus incommensurable from the start (even though work in
one category can absolutely inform work in the other category).
Theorists working in category 2 have two avenues available to them that would solve
their variant of the CCP. Both avenues consist in challenging the particular
computations of zero-point energies in contemporary particle physics as providing an
accurate heuristic for the values of the same in the future theory. The first avenue
usually involves disputing the assumption that calculations of vacuum quantities in QFT
formulated on flat spacetime resemble plausible predictions of vacuum quantities in QFT
formulated on a more generalized family of curved spacetimes. Instead, heuristic
accounts of QFT on curved spacetime are explored to determine whether the computed
zero-point energies are sufficiently suppressed so that the CCP does not appear. In other
words, this avenue is motivated by the possibility that the generalization of the standard
model of particle physics to particle physics in the presence of spacetime curvature, on
route toward a theory of quantum gravity, will happen to undercut the CCP.7
7For example, when Wald (1994) introduces his candidate for a semiclassical stress-
energy tensor that is defined with respect to the fundamental observables of a quantum
field theory understood in a setting appropriate for curved spacetimes, the uniqueness of
that candidate depends on putting in by hand its value when the relevant quantum field
is defined on Minkowski spacetime and arranged in its vacuum state. In other words, it is
essential in his approach that one stipulate what is the value of the zero-point energies that
The other avenue consists in suggesting potential modifications to standard particle
physics on flat spacetime, even before considering how the model could be generalized to
curved spacetimes. Work along this avenue explores what sorts of modifications would,
in effect, cancel out the currently computed values. The idea here is that the standard
model of particle physics is incomplete, even in the low-energy regime of approximately
flat spacetime. Improving upon the model, even still in the framework of QFT on flat
spacetime, might happen to resolve the discrepancy between Λ and the total
contributions from the zero-point energies. For instance, it was first noted by Zumino
(1975) that certain supersymmetric particle theories could suppress zero-point energies
in precisely the right way to remove the worry of the CCP. Generalizations of this idea
have become quite popular in the context of supersymmetric string theories (see, e.g.,
Kachru et al. (2003)).
There are many theoretical difficulties with this broad approach, especially if Λ is
non-zero (Witten, 2001), but its pursuit as a possible solution to the CCP is noteworthy.
The standard model of particle physics is incredibly well supported by empirical data, so
the idea is not that the standard model ought to be modified so as to address the CCP.
Rather, the idea is that there is value in determining which sorts of modifications to the
standard model of particle physics happen to solve the CCP. In the case of such
modifications, if in the future it were to turn out that such modifications to the standard
are thought to arise in standard model particle physics. Depending on one’s arguments
about how to generalize QFT to curved spacetimes, one may find themselves stipulating
different values, including those that would mimic the effects of the effective vacuum term
in the standard model of cosmology. On the other hand, as one reviewer points out, the
inflexible nature of this framework as a means by which to resolve the CCP can easily
lead to over-corrections, and therefore to a new instantiation of the CCP, as which seems
to occur in an article by Hollands and Wald (2004).
model were justified, then the community would no longer be worried about the CCP.
Along both of the theoretical avenues, notice how the CCP, not quite a problem
within its present context, is transformed into an ordinary, defeasible problem in the
contexts of new theoretical initiatives (e.g. QFT on curved spacetime, supersymmetry).8
I can be more explicit. A solution to the CCP by appeal to some new theoretical
initiative X can be understood as consisting in a demonstration that the CCP would be
a solved problem in the next generation of physical theory, were the next generation of
physical theory to include X. In category 2 (pursued by those who believe that
zero-point energies ought to wholly account for the presence of Λ in the standard model
of cosmology), X is any generalization of the standard model of particle physics, which is
presently formulated in QFT on flat spacetime, to a new theoretical framework
compatible with our present understanding of spacetime qua gravity. In such a
generalization, the CCP is transformed into a particular ordinary problem within that
framework: what is the total magnitude of the expected quantities of zero-point energies
that arise in that framework?
This suggests that one role of the CCP in its present form is to provide a heuristic by
which new theoretical initiatives are judged, or rather, explicit motivation for the pursuit
8It is worth flagging here what I intend throughout this paper by the term “theory”,
as opposed to “theoretical initiative” or “framework”. It would take us too far from the
central point here to discuss what ultimately ought to delineate these various constructs,
properly construed. As such, except where the word appears as parceled together in a
standard phrase from physics (e.g. quantum field theory, string theory, etc.), I have tried
to reserve “theory” for use just in regards to our current, well-supported theories of GR and
QFT (formulated on Minkowski spacetime), as well as in regards to the future theory of
quantum gravity we ultimately seek. Theoretical initiatives and frameworks, by contrast,
are more preliminary in nature, as the sort of things upon which or with the help of one
might hope to eventually develop successful cosmological models.
and development of some such initiatives over others. Once suitably transformed, the
defeasibility of the CCP (as it is rendered in the terms available to some new theoretical
initiative) is viewed as a strength of that theoretical initiative: because were it the case
that future physicists turn out to need the new theoretical initiative, a (future) problem
has both already been formulated and been subsequently solved. This could partially
explain the intense spotlight that has been shined on the CCP over the past several
decades: for as long as theoretical physicists have been seriously pursuing a new theory of
quantum gravity (and the standard model of cosmology was sufficiently mature so as to
warrant talk of Λ), the CCP has provided a heuristic by which to evaluate new proposals,
orienting focus in an otherwise wild theoretical field. Amongst those who think that the
new theory ought eventually to respect zero-point energies as the exhaustive sources of
the vacuum term that arises in present cosmology, solutions to the CCP in category 2
highlight which theoretical initiatives along the way are most attractive.
Contrast the transformation of the CCP relevant to category 2 with that which
occurs in the case of category 3. Recall that category 3 is characterized by its rejection
of the common semiclassical assumption that zero-point energies fully source the vacuum
term characterized by Λ in standard cosmology. For this category, X is any semiclassical
theory of gravity in which the geodesic structure of a spacetime is no longer thought to
uniquely determine the distribution of stress-energy across it. Beginning with the
assumption that this is to be the next new theoretical initiative, the CCP is transformed
into a different ordinary problem with a different ordinary solution: what new physics
can at least partially account for Λ, which is presently understood as wholly
characterizing a gravitating vacuum term? Approaches in this category generally
consider the addition of new fields on spacetime that do not couple to spacetime
geometry as traditional energy sources, or else more fundamental modifications to how
we think of the relationship between spacetime geometry and matter.
The first of these two avenues takes seriously the popular interpretation that Λ is, at
least partially, due to a “dark energy” that couples in atypical ways with the other
matter fields involved in standard particle physics. In other words, one expects there to
be an effective classical field theory that can characterize the accelerating expansion of
the universe. If it turns out to be a constant scalar field, then it is empirically
indistinguishable from the interpretation of the effective vacuum term as due to vacuum
energy contributions in the classical regime, but should be empirically distinguishable
from predictions of the standard model of particle physics in a high-energy regime
described by quantum field theories. If it turns out to be any other sort of field (e.g. the
model of quintessence given by Zlatev et al. (1999), or else that of an exotic fluid as
given by Kamenshchik et al. (2001)), then it is empirically distinguishable from the
current theories in both regimes. Either situation carries implications for an eventual
theory of quantum gravity.
The second avenue explores what it would take to capture the accelerating expansion
of the universe (whether constant or ultimately dynamic) as a cosmic-scale consequence
of certain local geometrical properties of spacetime, independent of the matter content of
the universe. In these approaches, the quantity Λ that arises in the current standard
model of cosmology is understood as an effective term that captures the magnitude by
which GR is inadequate as a framework on which to build cosmic-scale spacetime
models. f(R) theories of gravity are phenomenological examples of this approach, but
there are others examples as well. For instance, MacDowell-Mansouri gravity (Wise,
2010) and the related projects in “doubly special relativity” or “de Sitter relativity”
consider spacetime theories like GR, except where the most relevant tangent space at
each point is de Sitter-like, instead of Minkowskian (Kowalski-Glikman and Nowak,
2003; Aldrovandi and Pereira, 2009; Almeida et al., 2012).
Another example along this second avenue (but of a very different character to those
already mentioned) is found in cascading gravity models, which realize degravitation, the
theoretical notion that the presence of additional large spacetime dimensions can
effectively degravitate vacuum energies (De Rham et al., 2008). These approaches take
seriously the question “why does the vacuum energy gravitate so little?” (Dvali et al.,
2007, p. 1) and try to answer it by demonstrating feasible mechanisms (i.e. different
embeddings of four-dimensional spacetime in a higher-dimensional space) by which Λ
can be decoupled from any computed values of vacuum energies. The goal of these
projects is to dilute the relationship between the observed value of Λ and any computed
stress-energies of vacua in precisely the right way to reconcile observations and/or
predictions of the two in conjunction.
In all of these cases, note that the modifications to GR obviously influence
considerations about semiclassical gravity by providing a new classical theory that
semiclassical gravity must reduce to. This in turn guides which strategies toward a
theory of quantum gravity are considered most viable. In this way, considerations of the
many different sorts of solutions to the CCP that appear in category 3 reveal a richer
understanding of the role that the CCP plays in theoretical research: more than
providing a guiding hand as to which theoretical initiatives can do more than others in
the wild field of quantum gravity research, the CCP suggests possible physical
constraints on future theories of quantum gravity that are both motivated by our most
well-evidenced theories and that would otherwise be entirely unforeseen. Just like in the
case of the category 2 solutions to the CCP, both avenues of research in category 3 pave
the way for the eventual theory of quantum gravity to have a built-in solution to a
technical problem that formally reduces to the CCP. But now I can say a bit more:
category 2 solutions focus on pushing the boundaries of what we know about the
quantum nature of matter based on appeal to cosmological evidence, while category 3
solutions focus on pushing the boundaries of what we know about the relationship
between matter and spacetime geometry (i.e. geodesic structure) based on appeal to
cosmological evidence. Naturally, each of these is relevant in pursuit of quantum gravity.9
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper was to discuss the odd state of affairs surrounding the CCP, in
the hopes of drawing philosophical lessons about scientific methodology on the
cutting-edge of theory development. To that end, some care was given to how the CCP
was introduced: as a quirk of our standard model of cosmology but not technically a
problem within it, which only starts to look more like a problem when one turns one’s
attention to what future physical theories might entail. How the CCP transforms into an
ordinary problem in light of what future theories are thought to entail became the focus
of section 3, whereupon it was noticed that the CCP transforms into different problems
9There is a fourth category of solutions to the CCP in the context of future theory
that focuses on explaining away the CCP by heuristic arguments concerning probability
measures that emerge in the context of several speculative theoretical initiatives, which
render the observed value of Λ antecedently probable. Since the backbone of the fourth
category, anthropic reasoning, is a source of its own philosophical battles, the details of
solutions in this category have not been included in the present work. For more on the
subject, see Smeenk (2013) and Curiel (2015) to get a sense of the arguments that plague
the general approach.
for future physical theory depending on the assumptions one is prepared to make about
what the future theory will look like.
This unifying feature of all three categories– that the CCP of today will eventually
take the form of an ordinary problem with an explicit solution already provided–
suggests a general understanding of why it is that the CCP of today is treated by the
theoretical physics community as a problem at the forefront of their field. Simply put, it
is the reduction to the language of our present theories of (one of) the first empirical
problem(s) that the next physical theory (but not any current theories) will be expected
to solve, above and beyond all of the other problems that it must also already solve
(namely, all those that reduce to already-solved problems in our current best theories).
Moreover, it provides a way by which the consequences of our best current theories can
be leveraged for a glimpse at what may be necessary in the development of the next
generation of physical theories. That the solutions to the CCP— those glimpses at what
may be necessary— can sometimes seem entirely incommensurable as solutions to the
same underlying problem turns out to be an artifact of the quite reasonable observation
that there exists genuine expert disagreement about what we know today concerning the
future of physics.
In regards to the first of these points, Weatherall (2011) identifies a similar, although
retrospective, story concerning the equivalence (according to Newtonian physics) of
inertial and gravitational mass, where it was viewed as a problem that the two
Newtonian quantities were empirically indistinguishable (even though it technically was
not a problem for the theory). The solution (that is, an explanation of their observed
equivalence) came in the context of GR, even though there is no equivalent problem in
the language of GR to be solved (because there are no such things as inertial or
gravitational mass). Nonetheless, in the reduction of GR back to Newtonian physics, one
may derive the equivalence of the two Newtonian quantities, which seems to count as a
satisfying explanation in response to the original Newtonian problem. In this way, the
development of GR is retrospectively characterized as having made progress in regards to
the purported problem, even though there was no actual problem in the framework of
Newtonian physics and the theory of GR is such that there could never be any such
problem, coherently stated.
Weatherall (2011) uses this case to come to the conclusion that at least some
problems in physics have the effect of shaping the next generation of research in the field,
because their solutions involve departing from present theory and engaging in new
theoretical developments. Neglecting the details of his particular argument, I am inclined
to make a related but slightly stronger claim on the basis of the CCP: the primary
function of at least some problems in physics is to shape the next generation of research
in the field, because for researchers to merely entertain them as problems to be solved
requires new theoretical initiatives with which to properly articulate them. The
distinction between Weatherall’s claim and my own is subtle but important: my claim is
not that problems like the CCP are wanting for solutions in the next generation of
theory, whereupon today’s theory will be viewed as inadequate in regards to solving such
a problem. To the contrary, recall the slogan from the end of section 2: the CCP is about
future physical theory. That is to say, the broad strokes which characterize research in
frontier physics are laid out in accordance with the different ways in which intertheoretic
worries like the CCP can be converted into specific articulable problems to be solved,
whereupon by the time the details of the next generation of theory are worked out, those
brand new specific problems will already have been taken care of.
I contend that the intense focus on the CCP in contemporary theoretical physics
supports this claim. As a consequence of the community worrying about what can only
really be described (at worst) in present theory as the setting of a fit parameter
according to empirical data, multiple independent lines of advanced theoretical inquiry
have been developed, each of which features a sketch of future physical theory in which a
newly articulated problem has been solved. Moreover, those sketches can be easily
grouped, broadly, in terms of the additional, often pairwise incompatible assumptions
that would warrant them as components of the next generation of physical theory.
It would be a mistake to miss what is at stake in this claim. That we have access to
what are essentially first-order empirical problems within a future theory, without having
prior access to the details of that future theory, is extraordinarily counter-intuitive. That
potential solutions may be worked out for those problems in advance, prior to writing
down that future theory, is perhaps even more so. But I hope that the case study of the
CCP demonstrates how these affairs can nonetheless be so, albeit at the cost of there
being genuine peer disagreement about what we know today on the basis of our current
best theories of physics.
If the target of my hope here has been achieved, I believe that the present analysis
runs counter to an otherwise dominating metaphor in the methodology of theoretical
research. The dominating metaphor to which I refer is that which considers theory
development in terms of principled explorations of something like a ‘theory space’. As an
instance of this metaphor in action, consider the recent essay by Rovelli (2018), in which
he laments, in the context of frontier physics and quantum gravity research, what he
identifies as “the current “why not?” ideology: any new idea deserves to be studied, just
because it has not yet been falsified; any idea is equally probable, because a step further
ahead on the knowledge trail there may be a Kuhnian discontinuity that was not
predictable on the basis of past knowledge...” [p. 487]. The influence of the ‘theory
space’ metaphor is, I think, quite obvious: there exists some total collection of ideas from
which the next theory is to be selected, according to some or other principle of selection.
Rovelli’s charge against the frontier physics research community is that the relevant
principle of selection employed is something like random sampling with respect to a
principle of indifference. Against this principle of selection, Rovelli goes on to write that
“When we consider ourselves to be “speculating widely”, we are mostly playing out
rearrangements of old tunes: true novelty that works is not something we can just find
by guesswork”. In other words, the criticism of the “why not?” ideology is (at least in
part) one of internal inconsistency: that the sampling mechanism utilized in its name
does not conform to the specifications that would otherwise justify it. But Rovelli also
points out that the “why not?” ideology suffers, moreover, from that total collection of
ideas being too large to meaningfully sample.
Rovelli’s conclusion is that we ought instead seek a method that has science
proceeding “through continuity, not discontinuity”. My implicit suggestion in this paper
has been that there are such other methods that may already be found in practice, and
that the role of the CCP in quantum gravity research witnesses one of them. Namely, I
have suggested that the persistent identification of the CCP as a problem in need of
solution exhibits a method of theory development in the frontiers of physics, whereby
future theory is built in the first place as the sort of thing which already solves what may
today be recognized as empirical problems arising within it. Note the departure from the
‘theory space’ metaphor: my claim is not that theory development be understood, in this
case, in terms of the selection of a new idea from the space that happens to solve the
CCP; to the contrary, the new idea is built in the first place by supposing future theory
to already be constrained in certain ways (by the successes of current theory), and
subsequently solving the problems that would arise within the future theory given those
constraints.
Taking a step back, it is clear that by virtue of being entertained as empirical
problems in the context of some or other future theory, intertheoretic worries like that of
the CCP in our current best theories provide a way to leverage those current theories as
justifications for particular new theoretical initiatives in the pursuit of future physics.
That is to say, the CCP is best understood as a means by which the frontier physics
research community may illuminate the possible paths forward from current theories of
spacetime and matter to future, more sophisticated ones.
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